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A CALL TO MOVE FORWARD:
PUSHING PAST THE UNWORKABLE
STANDARD THAT GOVERNS
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS'
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE UNDER
MEDICAID
MICHAEL J. MCKEEFERY*
In an ideal world, every citizen from every country would have access to
health care coverage regardless of international boundaries. But, we do not live in
an ideal world. The financial burden of providing health care to undocumented
immigrants is simply too much for most countries to bear. As a result, law-making
bodies must walk the fine line between financial responsibility and humane
treatment in determining the extent to which undocumented immigrants are
covered under public health care plans.
Here, in the United States, Congress enacted Title XIX of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v), to govern undocumented immigrants' access to health
care coverage under the federal Medicaid Assistance Program.' Specifically, §
1396b(v) provides that undocumented immigrants only qualify for coverage under
Medicaid if they suffer from an "emergency medical condition." 2 The exact
meaning of this key phrase, however, is ambiguous within the explicit provisions of
the statute. This ambiguity means that many undocumented immigrants who suffer
from emergency conditions may be wrongfully denied treatment under Medicaid
by hospital personnel who are unable to predict what the phrase "emergency
medical condition" actually includes.
As a result, our federal judicial system has attempted to shed some light on
the ambiguity inherent in § 1396b(v). In Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v.
Copyright © 2007 by Michael J. McKeefery.
* J.D., 2007, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD). B.A., Sociology, 2003, The
College of William and Mary (Williamsburg, VA). Many thanks to the Editorial Board and the Staff of
the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy for their hard work and dedication in preparing this Note for
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encouragement.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2000).
2. Id. § 1396b(v)(2)(A).
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Hammon, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the
statutory language contained in § 1396b(v) and constructed a legal standard to
govern undocumented immigrants' access to health care coverage under Medicaid.3
Ultimately, the Second Circuit held that an "emergency medical condition," for the
purposes of § 1396b(v), is a "sudden bodily alteration such as is likely to require
'immediate medical attention. ' '
The Greenery test is too vague, however, to serve as an effective guide for
judicial analysis.5 The test essentially erodes the general rule stated in the statute,
since reviewing courts have used the Greenery standard to reach vastly different
conclusions.6 As a result, some in the legal community now argue that it has
become virtually impossible to predict whether an undocumented immigrant is
legally covered by the Medicaid program.7 Nevertheless, Chief Judge William J.
Sullivan of the Supreme Court of Connecticut has recently proposed a workable
solution to this concern. 8 In a recent dissent, Judge Sullivan advocated that a bright-
line test based upon § 1396b(v)'s genealogy and its relationship to other federal
acts is needed to create a legally consistent and precise definition of "emergency
medical condition." 9
This article establishes that the Second Circuit's Greenery test is entirely
unworkable when applied to real-life situations. As a result, the judiciary should
adopt the alternative approach proposed by Judge Sullivan for fairness and
consistency purposes. Part I of this work provides a general overview of the
growing debate in this country regarding undocumented immigrants' access to
health care services. Part I discusses the mechanisms through which
3. 150 F.3d 226, 231-33 (2d Cir. 1998).
4. Id. at 231-32.
5. Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 287-88 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J.,
dissenting).
6. See Quiceno v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 728 A.2d 553, 554-56 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (applying
the Greenery standard and finding that treatment for end stage renal failure is not covered under
Medicaid); Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 628 S.E.2d 1, 3-5 (N.C. 2006) (adopting the Greenery test and
concluding that Medicaid does not cover chemotherapy treatment for plaintiff's acute lymphoblastic
leukemia). But see Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 267-74 (applying the Greenery standard and holding that
treatment for the plaintiff's acute myelogenous leukemia is covered by Medicaid). See also Luna v. Div.
of Soc. Servs., 589 S.E.2d 917, 922-25 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the Greenery standard and
concluding that Medicaid may cover the treatment provided for undocumented immigrant's medullary
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma despite the achievement of stabilization); Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz.
Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 75 P.3d 91, 94-98 (Ariz. 2003) (applying the Greenery test
and holding that treatment for illegal immigrant's serious head and neck trauma may be covered under
Medicaid despite patient stabilization).
7. See Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 287-88 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting). The coverage line is one that is
important to draw, because if hospitals cannot predict which undocumented immigrants are legally
covered under Medicaid, they may have grounds to deny health care services to all undocumented
immigrants with potentially emergency-type medical conditions.
8. Id. at 284, 289.
9. See id. at 275.
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undocumented immigrants may receive necessary medical care and explains why it
is so important that Medicaid's application to undocumented immigrants is
governed by a clear and decisive standard. Part III introduces the reader to Title
XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v), the federal statute that
applies the Medicaid program to undocumented immigrants. This part also
discusses the concern presented by the statute's ambiguous language regarding
what health conditions actually constitute "emergency medical conditions." Part IV
provides a summary of the Greenery decision and an overview of the subjective
test formulated by the Second Circuit. Part V documents the unworkable nature of
the Greenery test by evaluating the inconsistent results that reviewing courts have
produced while applying this test to similar circumstances. Finally, Part VI
discusses the primary problems associated with the Greenery standard and analyzes
the nature and the likely impact of Judge Sullivan's alternative proposal.
Ultimately, this article suggests that the judiciary should employ Judge
Sullivan's alternative bright-line standard of analysis to establish fairness and
consistency in this area of the law. This action would ensure that hospitals do not
have an incentive to wrongfully deny health care services to undocumented
immigrants who genuinely require care for emergency conditions. In addition,
judicial adoption of this proposal would create a powerful incentive for the
legislature to finally clarify how undocumented immigrants are covered under the
Medicaid program. Thus, such action would represent a call to the legislature to
move forward.
I. THE TOPIC OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN
THE UNITED STATES IS AN ISSUE OF GROWING CONCERN
The issue of undocumented immigrants' access to health care services has
become a hotly debated topic in the United States. 10 In 2002, there were more than
9.3 million undocumented immigrants residing in this country." Due to rapid
increases in the country's undocumented immigrant population over the past few
years, undocumented immigrants now make up more than forty percent of the
foreign-born population in ten states.' 2 This continuous flow of unauthorized
10. See, e.g., Sana Loue, Access to Health Care and the Undocumented Alien, 13 J. LEGAL MED.
271, 271 (1992); James W. Jones et al., My Brother's Keeper: Uncompensated Care for Illegal
Immigrants, 44 J. VASCULAR SURGERY 679, 679 (2006).
11. Dana Deravin Carr, Implications for Case Management: Ensuring Access and Delivery of
Quality Health Care to Undocumented Immigrant Populations, 11 LIPPINCOTT'S CASE MGMT. 195, 196
(2006). This number is twenty-six percent of the total foreign-born population residing in the United
States. Id. Mexicans make up more than half of the undocumented immigrants. Id. Other illegal
immigrants are natives of Latin America, Asia, Europe, and Canada. Id. Approximately two-thirds, or
sixty-five percent, of undocumented immigrants residing in the United States live in California, Texas,
New York, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey. Id.
12. Id. at 196-97.
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immigrants into the United States has been so prevalent that it has captured the
attention of the nation's government, media, and citizenry.13
Generally, illegal immigrants flock to the United States in search of a better
life for themselves and their families. 14 This influx is due in part to the fact that the
United States has been targeted as a favored destination for immigrants. However,
this country has been quite unsuccessful in forcing new arrivals to comply with
existing immigration laws.15 As a result, the debate surrounding whether
undocumented immigrants should be afforded access to essential services,
including health care services, has been pushed to the forefront.
16
For the purposes of this debate, "undocumented immigrants" or "illegal
immigrants" are those individuals who are residing illegally in the United States.'
7
A person illegally resides in this country when that individual enters the country
illegally, or when that individual enters the country in a legal manner but violates
the explicit terms of his or her immigration status.' 8 As a whole, undocumented
immigrants are much less likely to have health insurance than native-born citizens
for several reasons. 19 First, more than a quarter of the undocumented immigrants in
the United States over the age of sixteen are part-time employees, seasonal
workers, or are unemployed altogether.2 0 Normally, part-time and seasonal workers
do not receive employment-based health care coverage.2 ' Second, undocumented
immigrants are usually barred from government insurance programs and often lack
the financial resources to obtain private insurance.22
For these reasons, the issue of whether undocumented immigrants should
have access to health care coverage in the United States has become an area of
considerable debate.23  Some participants in the debate argue that cost
considerations justify excluding undocumented immigrants from coverage. 24 They
13. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 679.
14. Megan L. Capasso, An Attempt at a "12 Step Program ": President Bush's Comprehensive
Strategy to Rehabilitate California and Mexico's Addiction to Illegal Immigration: Does it Strike the
Correct Societal Balance?, 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 87, 97 (2006).
15. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 679.
16. See id.
17. Carr, supra note I1, at 196. This article also uses the terms "illegal immigrants" and
"undocumented immigrants" to refer to individuals who are residing illegally in the United States.
18. Id.; see also Loue, supra note 10, at 272. Illegal entry into the United States includes the
following situations: entry without inspection, entry based on fraud, or entry based on misrepresentation.
Id. Immigrants violate the terms of their legal immigration status by remaining in the United States after
their legal authorization has expired. Id. at 272-73.
19. Carr, supra note 11, at 195.
20. Id. at 195-96.
21. Id. at 196.
22. Id.
23. See Mary J. Lopez, Access to Healthcare for Legal and Undocumented Immigrants, 21 IMMIGR.
& NATIONALITY L. REV. 641, 641 (2000).
24. See Jones et al., supra note 10, at 679; Lopez, supra note 23, at 652.
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contend that tax-supported services, like federal health care plans, cannot sustain
the increase in demand that would result if undocumented immigrants were
included in public health care programs.2 5 They also argue that immigrants who
reside illegally in the United States do not deserve to receive the benefits of health
care coverage, because undocumented immigrants do not usually pay taxes to
support federal programs.26 Another argument against granting undocumented
immigrants' access to health care services focuses on the fact that a denial of
coverage would likely create a disincentive for individuals to enter the United
States illegally. 27 According to this point of view, such a disincentive is
problematic because undocumented immigrants threaten national security, the
economy, the prevalence of the English language, American culture, and American
jobs. 28
By contrast, other scholars have argued that undocumented immigrants must
have access to basic human rights, such as education, employment, and health
care.29 According to this point of view, undocumented immigrants are human
beings and, as such, it is their moral right to have access to services that are
essential to sustaining life.30 Proponents of this perspective further assert that
coverage is a moral necessity because some undocumented immigrants are children
who have had no choice but to follow their parents abroad. 3' These scholars also
contend that health care coverage for undocumented immigrants is justified because
undocumented immigrants have been found to pay more in taxes than they collect
in benefits,32 and because many undocumented immigrants reside in the United
States for substantial periods of time and contribute much to their local
communities.
33
Based on the intensity of this debate, it is very important that the legislature
clearly establish whether undocumented immigrants are covered by health care
services under federal health care initiatives. The following part discusses the
various mechanisms in place to provide immigrants with access to health care
services in the United States, and explains why most of these mechanisms are not
25. See Jones et al., supra note 10, at 679-80.
26. See Lopez, supra note 23, at 641,651; Jones et al., supra note 10, at 680.
27. See Jones et al., supra note 10, at 679, 681 ("[D]emands for better border control and tighter
accountability for landed aliens who have evaded immigration laws have been loud and clear," and that
"[m]edical treatment for illegal immigrants is a growing problem complicated and inflated by elements
of jingoism, fear, and cultural identity.").
28. See id. at 679.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 679-80.
31. Loue, supra note 10, at 320.
32. See id. at 320 (citing Robert Reinhold, Taxes Aliens Pay to Texas Found to Top Benefits, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1983, at A 17).
33. Id.
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realistic means through which undocumented immigrants can receive health care
coverage.
II. THE MEDICAID ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS THE MOST REALISTIC MEANS
THROUGH WHICH UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS MAY ATTAIN HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE
Because the topic of illegal immigrants' access to health care has become a
hotly debated issue, it is important to note the current mechanisms through which
immigrants may obtain access to health care services in the United States. Once in
the United States, immigrants may be eligible to receive health care services
through three possible sources: the Hill-Burton Act, the Medicare Assistance
Program, and the Medicaid Assistance Program.34 This part discusses each of these
three programs in detail and evaluates whether each is a realistic means through
which undocumented immigrants may attain health care coverage.
First, while residing illegally in the United States, undocumented immigrants
may be able to receive health care services through certain provisions of the Hill-
Burton Act.35 Under this Act, the federal government assists participating public
and nonprofit hospitals in carrying out construction and modernization programs.
36
In exchange for this federal assistance, each participating facility must provide "a
reasonable volume of free or reduced cost care to individuals unable to pay and to
render services available to all individuals who [reside] ... in the facility's general
service area, without discrimination." 37 Thus, undocumented immigrants may be
able to receive free or reduced cost health care services from facilities participating
in the Hill-Burton program.38
Nevertheless, despite the Act's uncompensated care and community service
requirements, it is quite difficult for an undocumented immigrant to obtain health
34. Id. at 281-89. In addition, undocumented immigrants may also have access to health care
services under the common law. See id. at 278-81. Generally, the common law holds that a hospital may
deny treatment to a non-emergency patient, unless such a denial is racially discriminatory. Id. at 278-79.
However, a hospital is obligated to treat any patients that it begins to treat. Id. at 279. In addition, a
hospital may also be "obligated ... to provide emergency care when: (1) an 'unmistakable emergency'
exists; (2) the hospital has a 'well-established' custom of providing emergency care; and, (3) the patient
relies on the hospital's usual practice of providing emergency care." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Thus, undocumented immigrants may be able to attain emergency health care services under the
common law, as long as they satisfy the above requirements. See id. at 278-79. Nonetheless, the
common law has been significantly limited by certain legislative acts, such as the Hill-Burton Act. See
id. at 281.
35. Id. at 281-86; 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2000). Over one-half of the hospitals in the United States
have received funds pursuant to the Hill-Burton Act. Loue, supra note 10, at 281.
36. Loue, supra note 10, at 281.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 281, 285-86.
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care services under the Hill-Burton Act.39 A participating facility's obligation to
provide free or reduced cost care runs for twenty years after construction is
finished, or until loan repayment is completed. 40 As a result, many participating
facilities are no longer obligated to provide the free or reduced cost services
mandated by the Act.4' In addition, although the Act requires that participating
facilities provide posted notice of the availability of free or reduced cost services,
there is no provision in the Act requiring that the notice be in a language other than
English.42 Thus, it is unlikely that undocumented immigrants are aware that certain
facilities actually offer free or reduced cost health care services, since many
undocumented immigrants simply cannot read English.43
Moreover, the nature of eligibility determinations under the Hill-Burton Act
tends to bar undocumented immigrants from attaining health care services.
44
Regulations require that "aliens must have resided in the United States for at least
three months to establish eligibility. ' '4 In addition, these regulations provide that
participating facilities may require "any information that is reasonably necessary to
establish eligibility" as a condition to providing uncompensated care.46
Undocumented immigrants are often unable to provide this required
documentation, because many undocumented immigrants receive cash payments as
income.47 As a result, no evidence exists regarding their terms of residency or their
actual income levels.48 For these reasons, the Hill-Burton Act is not a realistic
means of attaining health care services for many undocumented immigrants
residing in the United States.49
The second way that some immigrants residing in the United States may
receive health care coverage is through the Medicare Assistance Program.50
Medicare is a federal program that provides health insurance to individuals who are
elderly or disabled.5 Medicare offers medical insurance to cover physician care
and provides hospital insurance to cover the costs of hospitalization and related
39. Id. at 283.
40. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 124.501 (2006)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM POLICY NOTICE NO. 89-5 (1989)).
46. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 124.507(b)(2)(A) (1991)). Facilities may also require that prospective
patients apply for benefits from third-party insurers or governmental programs. Id. at 283-84 (citing 42
C.F.R. § 124.507(b)(2)(B) (1991)).
47. Id. at 284.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 283-84.
50. See id. at 278, 286-87.
51. Id. at 286 (citing Social Security Act, tit. XVIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (2000)).
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care.52 Thus, immigrants who are elderly or disabled may be eligible to receive
health care benefits through the Medicare program.
Nevertheless, it is nearly impossible for undocumented immigrants to attain
health care coverage under Medicare.5 3 Unlike coverage under the Hill-Burton Act,
coverage under Medicare does not depend upon financial need.54 Instead, to attain
health care coverage under Medicare, an individual must have been employed
under a valid social security number.5 5 To attain a valid social security number, one
must demonstrate both a legal residence in the United States as well as
authorization to work.56 Naturally, undocumented immigrants are unable to satisfy
either of these requirements. 7 Many illegal immigrants also work in employment
sectors that are not included in the Medicare program.58 Thus, Medicare is also not
a realistic means through which undocumented immigrants can receive coverage
for health care services.59
The third way that immigrants residing illegally in the United States may
attain health care coverage is through the Medicaid Assistance Program. 60 The
Medicaid program is a national healthcare coverage initiative constructed by the
federal government. 61 Individual states may elect to participate in this federal
program, but are not mandated to do so. 6 2 Once a state chooses to participate in the
Medicaid program, however, that state must comply with the federal statutes that
define coverage under the program.63 The primary purpose of the Medicaid
program is to "fumish medical assistance to persons whose income and resources
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical care and services. '64 To
further this purpose, undocumented immigrants are covered under the Medicaid
program for "emergency medical conditions."
65
52. Id.
53. See id. at 287.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 278, 287-89.
61. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, 1199 (11 th Cir. 2002).
62. See M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (D. Utah 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2000).
63. See Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000)).
It is incumbent upon the court systems in participating states to ensure that states comply with the
mandates of the federal Medicaid statutes. See id.
64. Loue, supra note 10, at 287 (quoting DeJesus v. Perales, 770 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1985)).
65. Id. at 289 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2) (1988)). To supplement this coverage under
Medicaid, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) requires that hospitals
may not transfer any unstable patients, including unstable illegal immigrant patients, for purely
economic reasons. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (2000). EMTALA requires an emergency department
to provide an appropriate medical screening examination for any individual who comes to an emergency
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Thus, although health care coverage under Medicaid for undocumented
immigrants is limited, undocumented immigrants are still able to receive coverage
for emergency care under the Medicaid program.66 As a result, the Medicaid
program arguably represents the most realistic legal means through which
undocumented immigrants may receive coverage for necessary health care services.
Consequently, it is very important that a clear and decisive standard governs
undocumented immigrants' access to health care coverage under Medicaid. The
following part discusses Medicaid's application to undocumented immigrants in
more detail.
III. TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v), GOVERNS
MEDICAID'S APPLICATION TO UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) is the federal statute that governs Medicaid's
application to undocumented immigrants.67 This statute provides that "no payment
may be made to a State under this section for medical assistance furnished to an
alien who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise
permanently residing in the United States under color of law., 68 Nonetheless, there
is a significant exception to this general rule. Section 1396b(v)(2)(A) limits care
and services provided to undocumented immigrants that will be covered under
Medicaid to instances when an undocumented immigrant requires treatment for an
"emergency medical condition. '69 Thus, the issue in applying this statute becomes
which conditions qualify as emergency medical conditions.
Section 1396b(v)(3) provides a starting point for an analysis of how to
construe this ambiguous phrase.7 ° This section states that an
'[Elmergency medical condition' means a medical condition . . .
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity ... such that
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be
expected to result in-(A) placing the patient's health in serious
department and for whom a request is made for an examination of or treatment for a medical condition.
Id. § 1395dd(a) (2000). Under EMTALA, the definition of an "emergency medical condition" is
essentially the same as the definition included in the Medicaid statute. See id. § 1395dd(e)(I) (2000); §
1396b(v)(3) (2000). Thus, Medicaid and EMTALA were intended to work together to ensure that
undocumented immigrants who genuinely suffer from "emergency medical conditions" receive
necessary medical care. See infra Part VI.B. 1.
66. See Loue, supra note 10, at 289; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (2000).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2000).
68. Id. § 1396b(v)(1) (2000).
69. Id. § 1396b(v)(2)(A) (2000). This treatment must also satisfy two additional requirements. See
id. § 1396b(v)(2) (2000). The care and services must be provided to an undocumented immigrant who is
otherwise eligible for Medicaid coverage, and cannot be related to an organ transplant procedure. Id. §
1396b(v)(2)(B)-(C) (2000).
70. Id. § 1396b(v)(3) (2000).
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jeopardy, (B) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (C) serious
dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. 71
The precise meaning of "emergency medical condition" is still largely unclear,
however, when applied to the phrase chronic, debilitating medical conditions.72 In
other words, the line between acute conditions covered by the statute and chronic
conditions excluded by the statute is blurred when patient stabilization is achieved,
but ongoing medical treatment is still necessary to sustain the life of the patient.73
Thus, the issue arises as to whether this particular situation nevertheless constitutes
an "emergency medical condition," despite the fact that the patient is not suffering
from "acute symptoms. 74
Recently, courts have considered this particular issue in depth. 75 The Second
Circuit's analysis in Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Hammon is a notable
examination of whether an "emergency medical condition" exists when patient
stabilization has been successfully achieved.76 The following part discusses the
facts of this case and provides a brief overview of the test formulated by the Second
Circuit to govern this area of the law.
71. Id.
72. Szewczyk v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 277 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
Notably, the regulations that define an "emergency medical condition" do not touch upon whether
chronic, debilitating conditions are covered under Medicaid. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.255 (2006). In fact, the
definition for "emergency medical condition" contained in the relevant regulations promulgated by the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services simply mirrors the definition included in 42 U.S.C. §
1396b(v). See id. § 440.255(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3) (2000). Additionally, definitions of
"medical emergencies" developed by professional organizations have not specifically addressed whether
chronic, debilitating conditions should be considered "emergency medical conditions" under the statute.
See Loue, supra note 10, at 280 n.57. For instance, the American Hospital Association has defined a
medical emergency as "any condition that, in the opinion of the patient, the patient's family, or whoever
assumes the responsibility of bringing the patient to the hospital, requires immediate attention." Id.
(citing AM. HOSP. ASS'N, EMERGENCY SERVICES 5-8 (1982)). However, this definition is simply too
broad to strike a workable balance between humane treatment and financial responsibility. Other
definitions promulgated by professional organizations suffer from the same deficiency. See id. (citing
American College of Emergency Physicians, Definition of Emergency Medicine, 10 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 385, 385-88 (1981)) (discussing the definition of "medical emergency" promulgated
by the American College of Emergency Physicians).
73. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 277.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Greenery Rehab. Group, Inc. v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226, 231-33 (2d Cir. 1998)
(examining the Medicaid eligibility of undocumented immigrants suffering from chronic, debilitating
medical conditions under §1396b(v)); Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 267-74 (analyzing the application of
§ I 396b(v) to an undocumented immigrant suffering from a chronic condition that necessitated long-term
treatment).
76. See Greenery, 150 F.3d at 227.
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IV. IN GREENERY REHABILITATION GROUP, INC. V. HAMMON, THE SECOND CIRCUIT
CONSTRUCTED A VAGUE, SUBJECTIVE TEST TO GOVERN UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE COVERAGE UNDER MEDICAID
In Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Hammon, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit attempted to construct a workable definition of
"emergency medical condition."77 The rule formulated in this case is the current
standard used by reviewing state courts to interpret the application of the Medicaid
program to undocumented immigrants under § 1396b(v).78
The plaintiff, Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. (GRG), operated nursing
homes and specialized rehabilitation centers in several states for individuals
suffering from severe brain injuries. 79 GRG entered into various agreements with
the New York City Human Resources Administration (NYCHRA) to admit patients
into GRG's specialized brain injury care programs via the Medicaid Assistance
Program. 80 In this instance, GRG admitted two patients into its programs who,
according to NYCHRA, did not qualify for Medicaid coverage because they were
both undocumented immigrants residing illegally in the United States. 81 As a result,
NYCHRA refused payment to GRG to cover the hospitalization and the medication
costs incurred by these two patients.82
Each of the patients at issue suffered from sudden and serious head injuries
that "necessitated immediate treatment, and [that] ultimately left the patients with
long-term debilitating conditions requiring ongoing care and daily attention. ,83
Nonetheless, these patients also had been previously stabilized and transferred by
hospital personnel, so that the acute symptoms of their respective conditions had
been effectively treated.
84
Izeta Ugljanin, an undocumented immigrant from Macedonia, needed
immediate care for serious head trauma.85 After being successfully stabilized by the
GRG staff, she became a bedridden quadriplegic who required "a feeding tube,
continual monitoring, and extensive nursing care." 86 Leon Casimir, a thirty-eight
77. See id. at 232-33.
78. See Quiceno v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 728 A.2d 553, 555 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Szewczyk, 881
A.2d at 267.
79. Greenery, 150 F.3d at 228.
80. Id.
81. Id. This case also concerned GRG's admission of a third patient, Yik Kan, into one of GRG's
specialized brain injury care programs. Id. However, the court's analysis concerning Kan is not directly
relevant to this discussion because Kan had been granted legal residency in the United States and simply
had not yet met the residency requirements to qualify for Medicaid. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 228-29.
85. Id. at 228.
86. Id.
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year-old undocumented immigrant from Trinidad, suffered brain damage resulting
from a gunshot wound to the head. 87 After initial stabilization, he was transferred to
one of GRG's facilities. 88 Nonetheless, Casimir was left completely unable to walk,
and he required constant monitoring and medication for seizures related to his
condition. 89 In addition, Casimir needed assistance to perform daily life tasks, such
as bathing, dressing, eating, and using the toilet.90 These two patients would have
been eligible for healthcare coverage through the Medicaid program but for the fact
that they were undocumented immigrants residing illegally in the United States.91
GRG admitted Ugljanin and Casimir into their specialized programs for head
trauma under the mistaken belief that they were eligible beneficiaries under the
Medicaid program in New York State.92 Thus, when NYCHRA denied Medicaid
coverage to these patients, GRG instituted a legal action to attain suitable
compensation for the services rendered.93 In its complaint, GRG argued that
Ugljanin and Casimir were covered by Medicaid through the exception carved out
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v).94 GRG contended, in other words, that the phrase
"emergency medical condition" should be construed by courts to include chronic,
debilitating conditions. 95 On appeal, the issue became simply "whether chronic
debilitating conditions that result from sudden and serious injuries . . . are
'emergency medical conditions' as provided under § 1396b(v)(3). ' 96
Before examining the specific circumstances at hand, the Second Circuit
adopted a standard of analysis under which an "emergency medical condition"
refers to any "sudden bodily alteration such as is likely to require 'immediate
medical attention."'97 According to the court, the emphasis should be on the
"severity, temporality and urgency" of the particular medical condition at issue.98
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that conditions defined by acute symptoms are
covered under the Medicaid program because they necessitate immediate medical
attention.99 The court defined an acute symptom in this context as a symptom
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 229.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 228-29.
92. Id. at 229.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 231.
96, Id.
97. Id. at 232 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 741 (3d ed. 1981))
(emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id.
[VOL. 10:391
2007] UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 403
"characterized by sharpness or severity ... having a sudden onset, sharp rise, and
short course."' 00
By applying this "immediate medical attention" standard to the events that
occurred at GRG, the court found that Ugljanin and Casimir were not eligible for
Medicaid coverage under the exception carved out in § 1396b(v)(2)(A).'0 ' The two
patients' initial sudden and severe head injuries constituted "emergency medical
conditions" under the statute, but once the patients were effectively stabilized they
no longer suffered from conditions defined by acute symptoms. 10 2 Since their
conditions could no longer be considered acute in nature, the patients did not suffer
from "emergency medical conditions."'0 3 As a result, the court concluded that these
patients were not eligible for health care coverage under Medicaid for any ongoing
treatment after stabilization.' 4
This holding essentially conveys the notion that a patient does not suffer from
an "emergency medical condition" under the definition provided in § 1396b(v)(3) if
that patient's condition has been sufficiently stabilized by hospital personnel.'
0 5
However, this decision still does not shed light on situations where the cessation of
treatment for chronic symptoms would immediately result in the patient's death, or
in a significant impairment of the patient's bodily functions. The lack of clarity
with respect to this issue has led to inconsistent application of the Greenery test,
causing it to become a completely unworkable guideline. 10 6 The following section
provides a brief overview of the inconsistencies produced by the Greenery
standard.
V. REVIEWING COURTS EMPLOYING THE GREENERY STANDARD HAVE PRODUCED
INCONSISTENT RESULTS BASED UPON SIMILAR FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
In Greenery, the Second Circuit determined that a particular condition may be
considered an "emergency medical condition" as long as that condition requires
"immediate medical attention."'0 7 The court did not, however, provide reviewing
courts with any further guidance as to how to appropriately apply this broad and
100. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 23 (3d ed. 1981)),
101. Id. at 232-33.
102. Id. at 232. Ugljanin and Casimir required ongoing care and general maintenance, but there was
some doubt as to whether their health would be significantly at risk without immediate medical
treatment. Id. at 231, 233.
103. Id. at 233.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See cases cited supra note 6.
107. Greenery, 150 F.3d at 232.
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subjective standard. 0 8 Specifically, the court never defined the exact contours of
what "immediate medical attention" entails.'0 9 Thus, the test is susceptible to the
personal opinions and experiences of the reviewing court, so that decisions may,
ultimately, have little' to do with the actual merits of the case at bar." As a result,
the application of the Greenery test to medical conditions suffered by
undocumented immigrants has yielded vastly inconsistent results."'
Generally, reviewing state courts have arrived at one of two conflicting
conclusions regarding the proper construction of § 1396b(v). 112 Some courts have
applied the Greenery test and concluded that chronic conditions are not covered
under the statutory definition of "emergency medical condition.""' 3 Other courts
have used the Greenery standard to conclude that "emergency medical condition,"
under § 1396b(v)(3), may include chronic, debilitating conditions.' "4 Subpart A,
below, discusses cases holding that the definition of "emergency medical
condition" does not include chronic conditions'15 In contrast, Subpart B reviews
cases holding that chronic, debilitating conditions may be considered "emergency
medical conditions."'"1 6 These subparts provide examples of the two conflicting
lines of case law and emphasize the inconsistencies that the Greenery standard has
caused in this area of the law.
108. See Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 287-88 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Greenery test is unworkable because it is "impossible to implement in any
principled way").
109. See id. at 288 nn.29-30 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reasoning in
defining "immediate medical attention").
110. See id. at 288 n.30 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority does not follow its own holding
that the 'determination of the existence of an emergency medical condition should largely be informed
by the expertise of health care providers ....
11. See cases cited supra note 6.
112. See sources cited infra notes 117 and 140.
113. See Quiceno v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 728 A.2d 553, 555-56 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding
that treatment provided to an undocumented immigrant for end-stage renal failure due to systemic lupus
erythematosus was not treatment for an "emergency medical condition" and, thus, could not be covered
under the Medicaid program); Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 628 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. 2006) (holding that
treatment for acute lymphocytic leukemia is not covered under Medicaid).
114. See Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 261, 267-74 (Conn. 2005) (holding that
treatment for undocumented immigrant's acute myelogenous leukemia is covered by Medicaid as an
"emergency medical condition"); Luna v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 589 S.E.2d 917, 918, 922-25 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004) (concluding that Medicaid may cover treatment provided for undocumented immigrant's
medullary non-Hodgkin's lymphoma); Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost
Containment Sys. Admin., 75 P.3d 91, 94-98 (Ariz. 2003) (remanding the case to determine whether an
undocumented immigrant's serious head and neck trauma was a "non-chronic condition presently
manifesting itself by acute severity," so that the condition could be covered under Medicaid as an
"emergency medical condition").
115. See cases cited infra note 117.
116. See cases cited infra note 140.
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A. Some Reviewing Courts Have Found That Undocumented Immigrants May
Not Receive Health Care Coverage Under Medicaid for Chronic, Debilitating
Conditions
In some instances, reviewing courts applying the Greenery test have reached
conclusions in accordance with the Second Circuit's holding in Greenery." 7 These
courts have held that chronic conditions cannot be included within the definition of
"emergency medical condition" laid out in § 1396b(v)(3). 18
For instance, in Quiceno v. Department of Social Services, the Superior Court
of Connecticut found that undocumented immigrants are not covered under
Medicaid for the treatment of chronic, debilitating medical conditions." 9 In that
case, Astrid Quiceno was an undocumented immigrant residing illegally in the
United States. 120 She suffered from end-stage renal failure due to systemic lupus
erythematosus and, as a result, required ongoing, life-sustaining kidney dialysis.'
2
'
From June 1996 until December 1996, Quiceno received treatment at a Connecticut
hospital for her condition.'22 The State of Connecticut Department of Social
Services (SDSS) determined that kidney dialysis is not considered emergency
medical treatment and therefore denied Medicaid payment for Quiceno's
treatment. 123 As a result, Quiceno instituted legal action against SDSS to obtain
coverage under Medicaid for her treatment.' 
24
While reviewing these facts, the Superior Court of Connecticut adopted the
Greenery standard, asserting that "[t]he outcome of this case is dictated by the
recent decision in Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Hammon."' 25 By
applying the "immediate medical attention" standard, the court concluded that there
was not an immediate urgency to Quiceno's condition and, thus, Quiceno did not
suffer from acute symptoms.' 26 In coming to this result, the court stated that the
patients in Greenery were in a more fragile condition than Quiceno and, since those
individuals were denied coverage under § 1396b(v), Quiceno should also be denied
such coverage.' 27 As a result, the court ultimately held that Quiceno was not
117. See Quiceno, 728 A.2d at 554-56 (applying the Greenery standard and concluding that chronic
conditions cannot be covered under the Medicaid statute); Diaz, 628 S.E.2d at 5 (applying the Greenery
test and holding that acute lymphocytic leukemia does not constitute an "emergency medical condition"
under the statute).
118. See cases cited supra note 117.
119. 728 A.2d at 554-56.
120. Id. at 554.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 555.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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eligible for coverage under Medicaid because her condition could not be considered
an "emergency medical condition" for the purposes of § 1396b(v)(2)(A).' 28
Diaz v. Division of Social Services is another case in which a reviewing court
employed the Greenery test and found that a chronic, debilitating condition may
not be considered an "emergency medical condition.- 12 9 In that case, the plaintiff,
Hector Diaz, was an undocumented immigrant residing in the United States. 3 In
October 2000, Diaz began to suffer from a sore throat, severe nausea, vomiting,
bleeding gums, and exhaustion.' 31 He was diagnosed with acute lymphocytic
leukemia and received chemotherapy treatment for this condition until July 2002.132
During treatment, Diaz applied for health care coverage under Medicaid, but the
State of North Carolina denied his request.1 33 As a result, Diaz brought legal action
against the State.1
34
In deciding this case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted the
Greenery standard.1 35 The court concluded that "an emergency medical condition is
one which manifests itself by acute symptoms at the time of treatment and requires
immediate treatment to stabilize the condition, such that the absence of this
treatment would reasonably be expected to cause any of the three results listed in
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3)(A), (B), or (C).' 136 The court applied this definition to the
condition at issue, finding that Diaz was not eligible for Medicaid coverage for his
chemotherapy treatments 137 because "[d]uring [Diaz's] chemotherapy treatments,
his condition was stable and, therefore, he was no longer entitled to Medicaid
coverage."13
8
These cases illustrate that some reviewing courts have found that the
achievement of stabilization pushes a medical condition outside the limits of the
definition of an "emergency medical condition" as it is laid out in § 1396b(v)(3) 3 9
However, as the following section notes, other courts have rejected this notion, and
have instead held that treatment for chronic, debilitating conditions after the
achievement of stabilization may be covered under Medicaid.
128. Id. at 555-56.
129. 628 S.E.2d 1, 3-5 (N.C. 2006).
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id; Quiceno v. Dep't of Soc. Sers. 728 A.2d 553, 555 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
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B. Other Courts Have Concluded That Undocumented Immigrants May Be
Covered Under Medicaid for the Treatment of Chronic, Debilitating Conditions
Some courts applying the Greenery test under similar circumstances have
concluded that a condition may still be considered an "emergency medical
condition" despite effective stabilization. 40 The most notable example from this
line of cases is the recent decision handed down by the Supreme Court of
Connecticut in Szewczyk v. Department of Social Services. 141 In this case, Zbigniew
Szewczyk, a native of Poland, remained in the United States illegally after his visa
expired.142 In 1998, he sought medical treatment from his family physician for pain,
nausea, and overall weakness "so severe that he could take only one to two steps
before collapsing."'' 43 During this visit, Szewczyk's doctor referred him to an
oncologist at Stamford Hospital. 144  Szewczyk was diagnosed with acute
myelogenous leukemia, and was immediately admitted to the hospital. 45 As an
inpatient, Szewczyk received chemotherapy, surgery, and biopsies as treatment for
his medical condition.
146
When Szewczyk applied for health care benefits from the State through
Medicaid, his oncologist wrote a letter on his behalf, stating that acute
myelogenous leukemia "is a rapidly fatal disease unless treated aggressively with
chemotherapy." 147 The oncologist also wrote that without the therapy that was
provided by the hospital, Szewczyk likely would have died. 48 Nonetheless, despite
a lack of contrasting medical evidence, the hearing officer for the State concluded
that Szewczyk had not suffered from an "emergency medical condition."'' 49 The
officer found that there was no emergency because, absent treatment, Szewczyk
would not have died on the day that he was admitted to the hospital.150 After
140. See Szewczyk v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 267-74 (Conn. 2005) (applying the
Greenery standard and holding that treatment for the plaintiffs acute myelogenous leukemia is covered
by Medicaid as an "emergency medical condition"); Luna v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 589 S.E.2d 917, 922-25
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the Greenery standard and concluding that Medicaid may cover the
treatment provided for undocumented immigrant's medullary non-Hodgkin's lymphoma despite the
achievement of stabilization); Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys.
Admin., 75 P.3d 91, 95-99 (Ariz. 2003) (applying the Greenery test and remanding the case to
determine whether an undocumented immigrant's serious head and neck trauma was a "non-chronic
condition presently manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity," so that the condition
might be covered under the Medicaid program).
141. 881 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2005).
142. Id. at 262.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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receiving this officer's decision, Szewczyk instituted a legal action to force the
State to pay for his medical costs under the exception laid out in §
1396b(v)(2)(A)."'3
The court applied the Greenery test in the context of Szewczyk's
circumstances to determine whether Szewczyk suffered from an "emergency
medical condition.' 52 In adopting this standard, the court asserted that "[a]n
'emergency medical condition' must be manifested by acute, rather than chronic
symptoms .... It must necessitate immediate medical treatment, without which the
patient's physical well-being would likely be put in jeopardy or serious physical
impairment or dysfunction would result." 153 The court found that immediate
medical treatment was necessary to avoid placing Szewczyk's health in serious
jeopardy.154 Thus, the Supreme Court of Connecticut employed the Greenery
standard and found that an "emergency medical condition" existed despite
successful stabilization of Szewczyk once he was admitted to the hospital. 5 5 This
outcome directly conflicts with the conclusions reached in Greenery, Quiceno, and
Diaz, despite the fact that these courts all applied the same standard to similar
factual circumstances.
156
Likewise, in Medina v. Division of Social Services, the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina found that an "emergency medical condition" may still exist despite
the achievement of stabilization.'57 In this instance, Elmer Medina was hospitalized
and diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia. 158 As a result of his diagnosis,
Medina was treated with chemotherapy and began to suffer from severe acute
abdominal pains that were associated with his chemotherapy treatment. 159 Medina
applied for Medicaid benefits to cover the costs of his ongoing chemotherapy, but
the State of North Carolina rejected his request. 160 The State asserted that the
ongoing treatment should not be covered under the statute because the condition
was no longer an "emergency medical condition."' 16' As a result, Medina brought a
legal action against the State to obtain health care coverage for his ongoing
chemotherapy treatments. 162
151. See id.
152. See id. at 267.
153. Id. (quoting Greenery Rehab. Group, Inc. v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226, 233 (2d Cir. 1998)).
154. Id. at 273.
155. Id.
156. See Greenery, 150 F.3d at 232-33; Quiceno v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. 728 A.2d 553, 555 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1999); Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 628 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. 2006).
157. 598 S.E.2d 707, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
158. Id. at 708.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 709.
161. Id.
162. See id.
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With these facts to consider, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
concluded that Medina's condition may constitute an "emergency medical
condition" within the exception laid out in § 1396b(v)(2)(A).' 63 The court premised
its holding on the possibility that Medina could sustain significant impairment of
daily bodily functions or could die if hospital personnel withheld chemotherapy
treatment1 64 By remanding the case for further factual findings, this court, like the
court in Szewczyk, implied that an emergency medical condition may persist after
the patient has been successfully stabilized.1
65
As illustrated above, courts applying the Greenery test have construed this
standard in inconsistent ways. 166 One line of cases interprets the Greenery test as a
standard that precludes individuals who suffer from chronic, persistent conditions
from attaining health care coverage under Medicaid.167 Alternatively, other cases
construe the Greenery test to include ongoing treatment, such as kidney dialysis
and chemotherapy, within the exception carved out in § 1396b(v)(2)(A). 6 8 These
inconsistent results from similar factual circumstances necessitate the institution of
more precise guidelines to direct courts toward more consistent outcomes in future
cases. The following part discusses the problems created by the current standard
and offers a promising proposal for establishing a clear and decisive standard that
governs Medicaid's application to undocumented immigrants.
VI. THE GREENERY TEST CREATES SERIOUS PROBLEMS THAT CAN BE ALLEVIATED
BY THE ADOPTION OF A BRIGHT-LINE STANDARD
This part establishes both that the current test to evaluate Medicaid's
application to undocumented immigrants is inappropriate, and that an alternative
approach is necessary. Subpart A addresses the primary flaws associated with the
Greenery test.169 Subpart B discusses a promising alternative standard based upon a
renewed interpretation of what "emergency medical condition" actually entails
163. Id. at 710-1I.
164. Id. at 711.
165. See id. at 710-711. The court concluded that the case must be remanded because the trial court
did not make sufficient factual findings on the following issues: "whether [the plaintiffs] condition was
manifesting itself by acute symptoms ... whether the absence of immediate medical attention ... could
result in any of the consequences listed in the North Carolina rule (health in serious jeopardy, serious
impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part)." Id at 711. Unlike
the courts in Greenery, Quiceno, and Diaz, the court here left open the possibility that chronic,
debilitating conditions may still be considered "emergency medical conditions." See id.
166. See cases cited supra note 6 (discussing the holdings of various courts applying the Greenery
standard); Part V (detailing how reviewing courts employing the Greenery standard have produced
inconsistent results based upon similar factual circumstances).
167. See supra Part V.A.
168. See supra Part V.B.
169. See infra Part VI.A.
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under § 1396b(v). 170 If adopted by the judiciary, this alternative standard would
successfully address the major problems created by the Greenery test. Furthermore,
judicial adoption of this alternative standard could motivate the legislature to
finally clarify the ambiguities created by § 1396b(v).
A. The Problem: The Greenery Standard Promotes Inequity and Inconsistency
Based on the previously-discussed judicial holdings, 171 the Greenery test has
proven to be an unworkable standard of analysis for two primary reasons. First, this
standard produces inequitable outcomes because it does not account for all of the
medical conditions that could necessitate "immediate medical attention."'
172
Arguably, many chronic medical conditions that would likely result in immediate,
serious bodily impairment or death, if left untreated, would not be considered
"emergency medical conditions" under the Greenery test. 7 3 These conditions
cannot be considered emergencies under Greenery because they necessitate
ongoing care following stabilization and thus, cannot be resolved with a "finite
course of treatment."' 7 4 As a result, the Greenery standard ensures that some
patients who genuinely require ongoing medical treatment for life-threatening
conditions are precluded from attaining health care coverage, while other patients
with similarly life-threatening conditions qualify for coverage under Medicaid. 7 5
To illustrate this problem, consider the holdings in Greenery and Quiceno.176
In these cases, the Second Circuit and the Superior Court of Connecticut,
respectively, found that serious debilitating and life-threatening conditions, such as
major brain damage and kidney failure, did not constitute "emergency medical
conditions" under the "immediate medical attention" standard. 77 However,
cessation of treatment in those cases would have led to a "serious impairment to
bodily functions" in apparent violation of the explicit provisions of §
1396b(v)(3)(B).' 78 In both cases, application of the Greenery test barred patients
170. See infra Part VI.B.
171. See cases cited supra note 6 (discussing the holdings of various courts applying the Greenery
standard); Part V (discussing in detail how reviewing courts employing the Greenery standard have
produced inconsistent results based on similar factual circumstances).
172. See Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 277 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[lit is not clear whether the phrase ['emergency medical condition'] was intended to
encompass a condition ... that presents with severe symptoms but requires longer term treatment and,
therefore, reasonably may be characterized as chronic.").
173. Id.
174. Luna v. Div. ofSoc. Servs., 589 S.E.2d 917, 923 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
175. See cases cited supra note 6 (discussing the holdings of various courts applying the Greenery
standard).
176. Greenery Rehab. Group, Inc. v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1998); Quiceno v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 728 A.2d 553 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
177. Greenery, 150 F.3d at 228-229, 233; Quiceno, 728 A.2d at 554-56.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3)(B) (2000).
[VOL. 10:391
2007] UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 411
with seriously debilitating medical conditions from attaining health care coverage.
Nevertheless, the Greenery test ensures that patients suffering from serious
debilitating conditions that present with "acute" symptoms qualify for coverage
under Medicaid.' 79 If Medicaid coverage attaches to some life-threatening or
seriously debilitating conditions, then it should attach to all medical conditions of
this nature.18
0
Second, the Greenery standard produces inconsistent results in state courts.'81
These inconsistencies arise from the Greenery test's distinction between "acute"
medical conditions and "chronic" medical conditions. 182 Under the court's decision
in Greenery, only acute medical symptoms can be considered as rising to the level
of "emergency medical conditions" and, therefore, only the treatment of such
symptoms is reimbursable under § 1396b(v)(2)(A). 18 3 However, the line between
"acute" and "chronic" in this context is too vague to serve as a functional legal
guide. 184 For example, when an individual suffers from a lingering, seriously
debilitating injury, and the termination of medical treatment at any time would lead
to death or serious bodily impairment, then the injury can be perceived as both
acute and chronic in nature.'
85
Thus, whether an individual's health problems are classified as "emergency
medical conditions" for purposes of reimbursement under § 1396b(v)(2)(A) will
depend largely upon the subjective perception of the court and medical experts,
unguided by anything except an ambiguously worded statute.' 86 The consequence
of these subjective procedures has been that it is entirely impossible to predict
whether undocumented immigrants who come to the hospital with emergency
conditions are eligible for coverage under Medicaid. 187 As an unfortunate result of
such unpredictable outcomes, hospitals may begin to reject patients from ongoing
treatment programs due to an inability to predict whether undocumented
immigrants are legally covered under Medicaid.
179. Greenery, 150 F.3d at 232-33.
180. See Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 287-88 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J.,
dissenting).
181. See cases cited supra note 6 (discussing the holdings of various courts applying the Greenery
standard).
182. Greenery, 150 F.3d at 232.
183. Id. at 231-33. Section 1396b(v)(2) states, in part, that "Payment shall be made under this
section for care and services that are furmished to an alien ... only if--(A) such care and services are
necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical condition of the alien . 42 U.S.C. §
1396b(v)(2)(A) (2000).
184. See Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 287-88 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 288. Such an injury can be considered "acute in the sense that it was of sudden onset and
is severe, and it is chronic in the sense that it cannot be resolved with a finite course of treatment." Id.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 171-186.
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For these reasons, the Greenery test is an unworkable standard of analysis for
determining the eligibility of undocumented immigrants for Medicaid coverage.
The judiciary should instead employ a recently proposed alternative designed to
maximize fairness and consistency. 8 8 The following subpart discusses this
promising alternative standard in detail.
B. A Workable Solution: An Examination of§ 1396b(v) 's Legislative History and
its Relationship to Other Federal Statutes Reveals a Reasonable Alternative to the
Greenery Standard
In his dissenting opinion in Szewczyk, Chief Judge William J. Sullivan of the
Supreme Court of Connecticut presented a practicable alternative approach to the
Greenery standard. 189 This proposed alternative centers around a more precise and
workable definition of "emergency medical condition."'1 90 Judge Sullivan
constructed this definition from an analysis of § 1396b(v)'s legislative history and
its relationship to other interconnected sections of federal legislation.' 91 This
alternative is based upon the conclusion that Congress intended the language
contained in § 1396b(v)(2)(A) to be construed consistently with equivalent
language found in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA).' 92
Generally, this subpart discusses Judge Sullivan's alternative proposal and
explains why this proposal is preferable to the Greenery standard. 193 First, this
subpart examines the genealogy of § 1396b(v) and its relationship to EMTALA,
essentially explaining why § 1396b(v)(3) should be construed as having the same
meaning as § 1395dd(e)(1) of EMTALA. 194 This subpart then investigates the
meaning of § 1395dd(e)(1) to clarify the definition of "emergency medical
condition" contained in § 1396b(v)(3). 195 This subpart then provides a brief
overview of the bright-line standard envisioned by Judge Sullivan, 96 and explains
how this bright-line standard would address the primary problems created by the
Greenery test. 197 Ultimately, this subpart proposes that the judiciary should adopt
Judge Sullivan's alternative standard to create an incentive for the legislature to
finally clarify this traditionally ambiguous area of the law.
188. See Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 284 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 275, 277-284.
192. Id. at 280; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (2000) (defining "emergency medical condition").
193. See infra Part VI.B.
194. See infra Part VI. B. 1.
195. See infra Part VI.B.2.
196. See infra Part VI.B.3.
197. See infra Part VI.B.4.
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1. Based on an Examination of Legislative History, the Legislature
Intended That § 1396b(v) Would Mean the Same as § 1395dd(e) (l) in EMTALA
To determine the suitability of Judge Sullivan's proposed alternative and to
ascertain the manner in which Congress intended § 1396b(v) to be construed, it is
necessary to conduct a thorough review of the statute's genealogy, its legislative
history, and its relationship to EMTALA.' 98 In 1986, Congress enacted EMTALA,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, to amend the federal law governing the national
Medicare Assistance Program. 199 This statute requires hospitals participating in the
Medicare program to screen and stabilize all patients with "emergency medical
conditions" to the extent realistically possible. 200 Legislative history indicates that
the purpose of EMTALA is to address "inappropriate transfer[s] of 'patients in life
threatening situations' from the emergency rooms of private hospitals to public
hospitals 'for economic reasons alone'....,201
At the time of EMTALA's enactment, the United States General Accounting
Office conducted a study to determine whether a refinement of the federal
Medicaid laws would also be necessary to effectively advance the purposes of §
1395dd.2 °2 Six months after the ratification of EMTALA, Congress amended the
federal Medicaid law by enacting § 1396b(v)(3). 203 This amendment applied and
defined "emergency medical condition," a phrase originally included in §
1395dd(e)(l), in the context of the Medicaid program.20 4 As a result, the phrase
198. Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 277-84 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J.,
dissenting). Because the statute at issue contains ambiguous language, an analysis of the statute's
legislative history is appropriate. Id. at 277 (citing In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P., 282 F.3d 185,
188 (2d Cir. 2002)).
199. Id. at 279 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting) (citing The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act, or EMTALA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000)). EMTALA is also referred to as the
"patient dumping act." Id. EMTALA requires, in relevant part, that:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual (whether
or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the emergency department and a
request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical
condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within
the capability of the hospital's emergency department . . . to determine whether or not an
emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection (e)(l) of this section) exists.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). The Act further provides that "If an individual at a hospital has an emergency
medical condition which has not been stabilized (within the meaning of subsection (e)(3)(B) of this
section), the hospital may not transfer the individual . I..." Id. § 1395dd(c)(1).
200. Id. § 1395dd(b).
201. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 279 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 131 CONG. REC. 28,568 (1985)).
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(3).
204. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 279 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting). Specifically, § 1395dd(e)(l) defines an
"emergency medical condition" as:
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity . . . such
that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in-
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"emergency medical condition" likely means the same in § 1396b(v)(3) as it does
in § 1395dd(e)(1). 205
Furthermore, the United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) also recognized the relationship between § 1396b(v)(3) and § 1395dd(e)(1)
when it revised 42 C.F.R. § 440.255(c)(1), the implementing regulation for §
1396b(v)(3).2 °6 In modifying this section, HHS stated that "we have revised the
definition of emergency services ... [and] this change will make the definition of
emergency services consistent with the definition already in use in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(l)]. 2 °7
Based on this legislative history, Congress likely intended "emergency medical
condition," as defined in §1396b(v)(3), to have the same meaning as it does in §
1395dd(e)(1) of EMTALA. °8
2. The Definition of "Emergency Medical Condition " in § 1395dd(e)(1) of
EMTALA Only Includes Medical Conditions That Require Patient Stabilization
Since § 1396b(v)(3) likely mirrors § 1395dd(e)(l) of EMTALA, the
remaining determination is to decide what § 1395dd(e)(1) actually means. To
decipher the meaning of § 1395dd(e)(1), the relationship between § 1395dd(e)(1)
and two related provisions in § 1395dd must be considered. 20 9 These two related
provisions are §§ 1395dd(a)(2) and 1395dd(c)(1). 210 Section 1395dd(b)(1) provides
that hospitals participating in the Medicare program must stabilize patients
suffering from an "emergency medical condition."2 1' Additionally, once a medical
condition has been effectively stabilized so that "no material deterioration of the
condition is likely to result from" transferring the patient, the provisions of §
1395dd no longer apply.
212
Reading § 1395dd(e)(1) together with the definition of "stabilization" in §
1395dd(e)(3) creates a definition of "emergency medical condition" as "a condition
that requires stabilizing treatment in order to assure, within reasonable medical
(i) placing the health of the individual .. .in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to
bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1).
205. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 280 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 279 (citing Eligibility of Aliens for Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. 36,816 (Sept. 7, 1990)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 435, 436 and 440)). HHS revised 42 C.F.R. § 440.255(c)(1) to include the
following language: "the alien has, after sudden onset, a medical condition . I..." d. (quoting 42 C.F.R.
§ 440.255(c)(1)(1990)).
207. Id. (quoting Eligibility of Aliens for Medicaid, 55 Fed. Reg. 36,816 (Sept. 7, 1990) (codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 435, 436 and 440)).
208. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 280 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 280-81.
210. See id. at 281.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (2000).
212. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 280-81 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
[VOL. 10:391
2007] UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS' ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 415
probability, that no material deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or
occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility or his discharge. 213 Thus,
if stabilization is achieved, or if transfer or discharge of the patient is contemplated,
then any treatment received by a patient may not be considered treatment for an
"emergency medical condition" under § 1395dd(e)(1). 214 In other words, under the
meaning of § 1395dd(e)(1), patients would not qualify for health care coverage for
any procedures or medication used to treat chronic, debilitating conditions. The
following section provides a discussion of how this definition of "emergency
medical condition" should be applied in the context of the Medicaid program.
3. Under Judge Sullivan's Alternative Standard, Only Conditions That
Require Patient Stabilization Would Be Considered "Emergency Medical
Conditions "for the Purposes of§ 1396b(v)
According to Judge Sullivan, the legislature amended § 1396b(v)(3) of
Medicaid with the expectation that reviewing courts would interpret this provision
as having the same meaning as the similar Medicare provision in § 1395dd(e)(1). 21 5
As a result, Judge Sullivan's proposed definition of "emergency medical condition"
under § 1396b(v)(3) would only include medical conditions that require "stabilizing
treatment in order to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material
deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of
the individual from a facility or his discharge., 216 Any treatment beyond patient
stabilization would not be included within the definition of "emergency medical
condition" and thus, would not be covered by the Medicaid program. 217 Under this
proposed alternative standard, any undocumented immigrants who suffer from
medical conditions that require patient stabilization would be able to obtain health
care coverage through the Medicaid program for "emergency medical
conditions. 218 However, the moment that patient stabilization is achieved,
undocumented immigrants would no longer be eligible for health care coverage
through Medicaid.21 9
Thus, under Judge Sullivan's proposed standard of analysis, no
undocumented immigrant would be eligible for Medicaid coverage for any
treatment provided for chronic, debilitating conditions following patient
stabilization. 220 The following section explains why this bright-line standard is
preferable to the Greenery test.
213. Id. at 281; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1), (3) (2000).
214. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 284 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
215, Id. at 279-80.
216. Seeid. at 281.
217, Seeid. at 279-81.
218. See id. at 284.
219. Seeid.
220. See id.
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
4. Judge Sullivan's Proposed Standard of Analysis Addresses the Major
Problems Created by the Greenery Test
Judge Sullivan's bright-line test would successfully address the two primary
problems associated with the Greenery standard: its tendency to produce
inequitable results for patients, and its susceptibility to generating inconsistent
outcomes among reviewing state courts. First, Judge Sullivan's alternative proposal
would address the problem of inequity by setting easily-understood guidelines for
what conditions are included within the exception carved out in §
1396b(v)(2)(A). 22 ' Treatment for a medical condition would only be covered under
222Medicaid if patient stabilization is necessary. As a result, under this proposal, it
would no longer be the case that some patients would be able to attain coverage
under Medicaid while other patients suffering from the same or similar conditions
would be rejected coverage.22 3 Instead, it would be clear that all life-threatening or
seriously debilitating medical conditions would be covered under Medicaid prior to
stabilization, and that medical conditions would not be covered once stabilization is
achieved.22 4
Second, this proposal would address the problem of judicial inconsistency by
making the applicable test an objective standard, rather than a subjective standard.
Under the proposed alternative test, reviewing courts would only have to determine
whether a patient has been stabilized.2 5 Stabilization represents a more reliable
legal guide than "immediate medical attention," because stabilization is a medical
concept that is more readily discernable. Very simply, a patient is stabilized when
the status of the patient will not deteriorate during transfer. 26 Thus, under this
standard, no subjective analyses would be necessary, and reviewing state courts
would not likely produce inconsistent rulings. Consequently, this proposal would
incentivize hospitals to treat undocumented immigrants who require immediate
care, because hospital personnel would be better able to predict which patients
qualify for Medicaid coverage.
In addition, Judge Sullivan's proposed alternative balances the notions of
humane treatment and financial responsibility in this area of the law. This
alternative standard would ensure that undocumented immigrants who genuinely
need emergency care would be afforded access to health care coverage under
Medicaid. Simultaneously, this bright-line standard would also address the issue of
221. See supra Part VI.A.
222. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 284 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
223. See supra Part VI.A.
224. Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 284 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 289.
226. Under EMTALA, "the term 'to stabilize' means, with respect to an emergency medical
condition..., that no material deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the
transfer of the individual from a facility .... 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (2000).
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financial responsibility by setting coverage limits based upon patient stabilization.
This proposed standard represents a workable compromise in the context of
undocumented immigrants' access to health care services in the United States.
Moreover, Judge Sullivan's proposed interpretation of § 1396b(v) conforms
to general federal policy, and complies with the ultimate holding in Greenery.227 By
basing Medicaid coverage for undocumented immigrants upon stabilization, this
standard of analysis is consistent with federal law, which provides that
undocumented immigrants should be ineligible for public benefits through state and
local governments.228 In addition, by clarifying that chronic conditions may never
be covered under Medicaid, this alternative standard is consistent with the Second
Circuit's precedent-setting decision in Greenery that long-term treatment precludes
Medicaid eligibility.
229
Most importantly, however, this alternative proposal would create a powerful
incentive for the legislature to finally clarify what "emergency medical condition"
actually entails under § 1396b(v). If the current legislature agrees that Medicaid
cannot apply to undocumented immigrants with chronic, debilitating conditions,
then this alternative proposal would supply the intended outcome. On the other
hand, however, if the legislature deems this standard to be too harsh on
undocumented immigrants, then the legislature would be strongly encouraged to
revise § 1396b(v) to explicitly protect undocumented immigrants suffering from
chronic, debilitating conditions. Thus, unlike the vague Greenery standard, this
alternative proposal would represent a call to the legislature to clarify a traditionally
ambiguous area of the law.
CONCLUSION
The federal statute governing Medicaid's application to undocumented
immigrants, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v), contains ambiguous language.230 This statute
generally states that medical treatment provided to an undocumented immigrant is
only covered under Medicaid when an undocumented immigrant suffers from an
"emergency medical condition., 231 The phrase "emergency medical condition,"
however, is defined in a manner that leaves the following issue unresolved: is
treatment received by an undocumented immigrant for chronic, debilitating
227. See Greenery Rehab. Group, Inc. v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226, 233 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
the statutory definition of "emergency medical condition" is plain in meaning).
228. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2000).
229. See Greenery, 150 F.3d at 233.
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2000).
231. Id. § 1396b(v)(2)(A).
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conditions over an extended period of time nonetheless covered by the Medicaid
Assistance Program?
232
The Second Circuit constructed a test in its Greenery decision to assist courts
in determining the scope of the phrase "emergency medical condition. 233 The court
construed this phrase to mean that a medical condition is covered under the
Medicaid program as long as the condition at issue necessitates "immediate
medical attention. 2 34 This standard, however, provides very little guidance to
reviewing state courts.235 As a result, state courts, aided only by a subjective
standard and an ambiguously worded statute, have produced vastly inconsistent
holdings as to whether treatment for chronic, debilitating conditions comes within
the purview of § 1396b(v)(2)(A) 6 These inconsistencies have generated
inequitable circumstances and unpredictability in this area of the law.237 For these
reasons, the Greenery test has proven to be ineffective and unworkable. 238 An
alternative approach to analyzing this issue is needed. 9
An examination of the legislative history of § 1396b(v) and its relationship
with other federal statutes reveals a promising solution to the problems created by
the Greenery standard. 240 Legislative history indicates that the legislature intended
241for § 1396b(v)(3) and § 1395dd(e)(1) of EMTALA to have the same meaning.
As a result, the meaning of "emergency medical condition" under § 1396b(v)
becomes clear. Because EMTALA's provisions indicate that an "emergency
medical condition" only occurs when stabilization is necessary, treatment for
chronic conditions should not be covered by Medicaid under § 1396b(v).242 Thus,
under Medicaid, only treatment for medical conditions that necessitate patient
stabilization should be covered.243
232. See Szewczyk v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 287-88 (Conn. 2005) (Sullivan, C.J.,
dissenting).
233. Greenery, 150 F.3d at 231.
234. Id. at 232.
235. See Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 287-88 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
236. See, e.g., Quiceno v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 728 A.2d 553, 555-56 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(concluding that a chronic condition that necessitates long-term care may not be included within the
meaning of "emergency medical condition"). But see, e.g., Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 272-74 (determining
that a chronic condition may be included within the definition of "emergency medical condition").
237. See supra Part V.
238. See Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 287-88 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 274-75.
240. See id. at 275.
241. See 131 CONG. REc., Pt. 21, 28,568 (1985) (indicating that Congress intended EMTALA to
address the problem of the transfer of "patients in life threatening situations for economic reasons alone.
..."); see also Eligibility of Aliens for Medicaid, 55 FedReg. 36,816 (Sept. 7, 1990) (codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 435, 436 and 440).
242. See Szewczyk, 881 A.2d at 280-81 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
243. See id. at 284.
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The judiciary should adopt this bright-line standard to clarify what conditions
are actually covered under the exception provided by § 1396b(v)(2)(A). Unlike the
Greenery standard's vague approach, this proposal would create identifiable
boundaries regarding what medical conditions qualify undocumented immigrants
for Medicaid coverage. As a result of such defined boundaries, this proposal would
motivate hospital personnel to provide treatment to undocumented immigrants who
genuinely need emergency care. In addition, this alternative standard would create
a powerful incentive for the legislature to finally clarify Medicaid's application to
undocumented immigrants. Judicial adoption of Judge Sullivan's proposed standard
would represent a call to the legislature to move forward and provide clarification
in this uncertain area of the law.

